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This note reports and reemphasizes the importance of a balancedness condition 
for production sets which-if combined with otherwise standard assumptions- 
guarantees the non-emptiness of the core. Balancedness neither requires nor implies 
any property related to returns to input scale. It is argued that the emphasis laid by 
Scarf and others on a particular kind of increasing returns to scale is not essential 
for the existence result in general. It is shown, however, that Scarf’s distributivity 
assumption implies balancedness. Finally, it is pointed out that earlier results 
indicate that equilibria in the core require a specific profit distribution to consumers 
rather than a particular behavioral rule of producers even in the presence of non- 
convexities. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 021, : T  1988 
Academic Press. Inc 
In Chap. 21 of the “Contributions to Mathematical Economics: In 
Honor of Gtrard Debreu” [9], H. Scarf makes available a set of 
unpublished notes on the core of a productive economy when there are 
increasing returns. The ideas and concepts of these notes seem to have had 
a substantial influence on researchers who were trying to develop an alter- 
native to the competitive equilibrium concept when production sets exhibit 
increasing returns to scale (see, for example, the recent paper by Dehez and 
Dr&ze [6]). Scarf’s article and the work of others (e.g., [S]) create the 
impression as if increasing returns to scale in production are a major cause 
for an empty core in a production economy. Starting with such a premise 
he and others approached the existence question of the core by searching 
for equilibrium concepts with increasing returns with the hope (1) that 
existence of such equilibria could be established for a large set of economies 
and (2) that the standard inclusion property holds. 
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A number of publications of the mid-seventies, however, support quite 
a different point of view. Non-convexities of production sets are not 
the central issue for the existence of the core, and any specific behavioral 
rule of a non-convex producer does not yield the inclusion property. 
Specifically: 
(1) Increasing returns to scale in production and the existence of the 
core in a productive economy have very little to do with each other on a 
general conceptual level. What matters for the existence of the core instead 
are the returns to coalition size relative to the feasible production set. 
Scarf’s model treats the special case only where returns to scale of produc- 
tion in an enlarged space imply the right kind of returns to coalition size in 
the space of commodities with which agents are concerned. The dis- 
tributivity assumption introduced by Scarf within his special structure 
implies the balancedness condition introduced in [3], so that existence of 
the core in his case follows from the 1974 theorem. 
(2) The equilibrium concepts suggested in [ 111 and [l] independent- 
ly, which stipulate a particular profit distribution, guarantee in a natural 
way the inclusion property and a possible limit theorem. However, it is also 
evident from these papers that returns to coalition size rather than returns 
to input scale are the important assumptions for the result. It remains an 
important but separate question which behavioral rule of the firm replaces 
profit maximization in a non-convex environment to obtain existence of 
market equilibria. However, [l] and [ 1 l] provide the answer to the 
question of how profits are to be distributed if one requires at the same 
time that these equilibria are in the core. 
RETURNS TO SIZE vs RETURNS TO SCALE 
From a conceptual viewpoint the general model presented in 1974 is an 
appropriate extension of an exchange economy to treat the problem of 
blocking and of the core in an economy with production. The abstract 
description of a production possibility set Ys associated with a coalition S 
allows for a wide range of interpretations. From a modelling point of view 
of a cooperative theory, both of the following situations should be included 
in the formulation: larger coalitions may become more effective because of 
the pooling of their technological as well as their organizational know-how 
(increasing returns to size). On the other hand, a larger group may become 
very ineffective (decreasing returns to size) if, for example, it does not know 
how to pool its resources efficiently, or if there are costs to coalition 
formation. Existence of the core depends on the blocking power of any 
coalition S relative to the overall feasible set; i.e., the size of all of the sets 
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YS and their relationship matters and not whether these sets are convex. 
Hence, the essential property required for the general existence proof in 
[3] imposes that coalitions’ productive power is not too large. 
Let 6 = {I, (X,, ei, ki), (( YS), Y)} denote a coalition production 
economy with commodity space [w’. The interpretation of ((Y’), Y) means 
that YS c [w’ is what coalition S can enforce through cooperation, and Y is 
what is feasible for the economy. Therefore, a priori one need not have to 
have Y’ # Y. 
DEFINITION. (( YS), Y) is called balanced if for every balanced family of 
coalitions 6 and associated positive weights {d, 1 SE G} 
c d, Ys c Y. 
SEG 
Balancedness neither requires nor imposes properties like free disposal, 
0 E YS, or non-increasing returns to scale. To see this, consider the 
following example. Let I= 2; choose a positive number c and define 
Then (( YS), Y’) is balanced. 
In [4] a characterization of balanced technologies was given which 
shows that a balanced distribution of productive knowledge can be 
generated from productive factors specific to each agent and coalition and 
a common larger technology. Assume that there are k productive factors in 
addition to the I commodities. Agents possess endowments ORE Iwt (in Z). 
The aggregate technology available to all coalitions is a set PC R’x Rk 
and the productive power of coalitions is defined by 
y~={Yew’~(Y, -,W )E P]. 
Reference [4] contains the following two lemmas. 
LEMMA 1. If F is a conuex cone, then (( Y’), Y’) is totally balanced. 
LEMMA 2. Let (( YS), Y’) be totally balanced. Then there exists a set 
YcWx[Wk withk=/Z1=n,foraNiEZ, 
wi = (Wli, . . . . wEi), wii= 1, and co,=0 ifi# j, 
such that 
Y”={yELlq(Y, -,w+ F}. 
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Scarf confines himself exclusively to the particular model used in both 
lemmas. Technological knowledge is the same for all agents, whereas group 
specific productive power is defined by group specific productive resources. 
With his additional assumption of free disposal this excludes decreasing 
returns to size, coalition formation costs etc. Moreover, his assumption of 
distributivity on P implies a totally balanced technology in the space of all 
other commodities. 
DEFINITION. PC R’ x Wk is called distributive if for any finite number 
of points yi E F, yj = (yi, y$), and any non-negative ai, the point 
y=(y’, yk)=Caiy,E F, ifyf-y’<O. 
It is straightforward to show that a distributive F generates a totally 
balanced technology ((Y’), Y’). Consider 6 balanced with {d,l SE G}. 
Then, ys E Y’, SE 6 implies 
1 do (Y’y - 1 mi) = ( 1 d, Ys, - 1 m,) E 7 
StZ it? s .SEG iel 
since for all S, CiGS~i<CIE, oi. It is apparent from this that the increas- 
ing returns to scale in l% ’ + k imply a balanced form of increasing returns to 
size which is all that matters for the existence of the core. A consequence of 
this observation is that the existence theorems in [9] and [8] become a 
special case of Theorem 2 in [3], restated here in a slightly different 
version. 
THEOREM. Let Q= {I, (Xi, e;, ki), ((Y’), Y)} be such thatfor every ill 
(1) Xi c R’ is closed convex, and bounded below. 
(2) ki is a complete, transitive, continuous, and convex preference 
ordering on Xi. 
(3) X,n { Yii)+ {e,)} is non-empty. 
Moreover, 
(4) Ys is closed for all S c I. 
(5) Y is closed and AY n R’+ = {O}, where AY is the asymptotic cone 
of Y. 
(6) (( Y”), Y) is balanced. 
Then E has a non-empty core. 
MARKET EQUILIBRIA IN THE CORE 
The essential feature of the equilibrium concept proposed in [ 1, 5, ll] is 
that profits are distributed to consumers in such a way that the distribution 
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belongs to the core of an associated side-payment game. This property 
drives the inclusion theorem. No particular behavioral assumption as to 
profit maximization is required by definition. However, increasing returns 
to size may imply this additional feature in equilibrium. In [l] a very 
general concept of equilibrium with firms is proposed which does not 
prescribe a specific behavioral rule vis-a-vis prices and markets. This shows 
once again that the requirements, to describe market equilibria which 
belong to the core, may be distinctly different from the behavioral rules 
which the increasing returns literature seeks in order to decentralize 
production decision under increasing returns. Profit distribution and its 
relationship to the coalition specific productive factors are more important 
than the behavioral rule of each firm. It would be interesting to establish 
the relationship between the equilibrium concepts used by Scarf [9], by 
Quinzii [S], and by Sharkey [lo] to the one with the appropriate profit 
distribution. 
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